Abstract -
INTRODUCTION
T ax rebate policies have often been discussed as a tool that the government may use to stimulate consumer spending and, so the hope goes, boost the economy in general. However, the effi cacy of tax rebates to stimulate consumer spending is still an open question, both theoretically and empirically. This paper estimates the consumption response to a series of state rebates distributed between 1995-2001 using data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey.
At the federal level, two rebates have been distributed in recent years. A provision in the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA) consisted of a decrease in the lowest tax rate from 15 percent to 10 percent, the benefi ts of which were mailed out in a rebate check that amounted up to $300 for individuals or $600 for those married fi ling jointly. In addition, the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 (JGTRRA) provided for a $400 increase in the Child Tax Credit, the benefi ts of which were mailed out to eligible taxpayers in July and August of 2003. A few recent papers Slemrod (2002, 2003) and Johnson, Parker, and Souleles (2004) , for example) have attempted to estimate the effect of these federal rebates on spending, but the evidence on the effect of such rebates is still sparse.
The contribution of this paper, then, is to estimate the expenditure response to state level rebates that were imple-mented in Connecticut, Minnesota, Oregon, and Wisconsin between 1995 and 2001 . Studying these state tax rebates is advantageous for a number of reasons. First, the timing of the rebates varied across states, so that one can identify the effect of the tax rebates off of the difference between the expenditure paths of individuals in a state-quarter in which a rebate was received, and the expenditure path of individuals in states in which rebates were received at some point, but not received in that particular quarter. 1 Second, the magnitude of rebates varied widely across states, even for a given income level, and varied considerably within states. As a result, these rebates contain much more identifying variation than the federal rebates, whose amounts were predominantly $300 for single fi lers and $600 for married fi lers.
2 Third, in this study, it is possible to differentiate between the response to the enactment of rebates (when the law is signed) and the implementation of rebates (when the rebate is received). Although previous studies have been able to examine households' response to the receipt of the rebate, since they all examined federal policies, there was no variation in when the law was signed by the president, which could be used to identify the consumption response to these events. In this study, signing of the state level rebates varied across states, and so it is possible to examine whether households' consumption patterns responded to this enactment.
However, these strengths come at a cost, in that respondents to the Consumer Expenditure Survey were not asked specifi cally about the receipt of these state rebate checks, and so rebate amounts must be imputed using the data available. As a result, any lack of signifi cance in the resulting estimates could simply be due to attenuation bias resulting from a low signal to noise ratio in the independent variable. Despite this weakness, some signifi cant effects of the rebates emerge.
Results from the base specifi cation suggest that receipt of a rebate check has a positive, though insignifi cant, effect on the expenditures of individuals who receive them in the overall sample. Consistent with Shapiro and Slemrod (2003) and Johnson et al. (2004) , these results suggest that approximately one-fi fth to onefourth of the rebate amounts were spent in the quarter of receipt. The estimates also suggest positive responses to the rebates in nondurable spending and spending on apparel in particular, and among households with single respondents. The results vary substantially, however, depending on the sample, regressor used, and component of expenditure examined, with several variables entering insignifi cantly or with the wrong sign.
When the effect of the announcement of the rebate check amounts is estimated, mixed results are found. The announcement of a rebate is estimated to have had a small and insignifi cant effect on the amount of spending, but may have shifted the composition of spending toward durable goods in the quarter of announcement.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the relevant literature, and the tax rebates passed in the states under analysis are described in the third section. The fourth section details the data and empirical strategy used. The fi fth section presents estimation results on the estimated response to the receipt of a rebate, and the sixth section presents results on the estimated response to the announcement of the distribution of rebates. The fi nal section concludes.
RELEVANT LITERATURE
Theoretically, the effect that receipt of a tax rebate will have on consumer spending depends on the assumed behavioral model. For example, under a simple intertemporal choice model in which the rebate is anticipated, such a policy would have no effect on spending, since receipt of the rebate would not affect the family's expected lifetime resources. However, in an intertemporal model in which some individuals are credit constrained, such individuals might be induced to increase spending by such a policy, in order to move closer to their unconstrained optimal consumption path (see Browning and Lusardi (1996) ). From the behavioral literature, "rule of thumb" or "mental accounting" type models would predict that individuals might spend most or all of their rebate checks. However, this prediction depends crucially on how individuals classify the tax rebate in their "mental accounts," which is inherently unobservable (see Thaler and Loewenstein (1989) and Thaler (1990) ).
Empirically, a number of studies have attempted to evaluate the effects of transitory changes in income, both predictable and unpredictable, on consumer spending. Though these papers focus on whether people smooth consumption in line with a lifecycle model, they might also shed light on how individuals' consumption responds to changes in tax parameters.
For example, Wilcox (1989) , Parker (1999) , and Souleles (2002) each fi nd significant responses to pre-announced changes in income due to various tax changes. Since these changes in income were predictable, these authors argue that their results are evidence against a lifecycle model. Further, several papers (including Souleles (1999) , Barrow and McGranahan (2000) , and Hsieh (2003) ) have estimated (at least in part) consumers' responses to the receipt of tax refunds, and found signifi cant consumption responses to refund receipt.
Several older papers have also attempted to estimate the effect of tax rebate checks per se on consumer spending using, including Blinder (1981) and Poterba (1988) . In addition, three recent papers have used individual data to estimate the effect of tax rebates on consumer expenditures. Slemrod (2002, 2003) found that only about a quarter of individuals in a special supplement to the Survey of Consumers reported that the EGTRRA 2001 tax rebates led them to mostly increase spending, regardless of whether they were asked before or after the receipt of their rebate check. Unfortunately, no questions are asked about by how much the rebate induced the individuals to increase their spending, so it is impossible to translate these directly into marginal propensities to consume. However, Shapiro and Slemrod (2003) do some back-of-the-envelope calculations, suggesting that the marginal propensity to consume could range from 0.34 up to 0.5. Finally, Johnson et al. (2004) use variation in the week in which the EGTRRA 2001 rebate checks were mailed to estimate the consumption response. They fi nd that households consumed a large portion of their rebate checks, spending between 20-40 percent of their rebate check on nondurables in the quarter of receipt and an additional third of the amount of the check in the following three-month period.
STATE TAX REBATES, 1995-2001
In the years preceding the passage of EGTRRA, states' projected tax receipts increased substantially from year to year, and actual tax receipts were quite often higher than had been projected. For example, according to the National Association of State Budget Offi cers (various years), in 2000, tax collections were projected to be approximately 4.3 percent above the previous year's receipts, and came in at 3.9 percent above these projections. This year was not an aberration; in the previous fi ve years, revenues had on average exceeded projections by at least two percent. As a result, throughout this period, the majority of states ran general fund surpluses.
3 States responded to these surpluses in a number of ways, the most prevalent of which were increasing rainy day or budget stabilization funds, investing in capital construction or education, and reducing taxes.
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Most pertinent to the study at hand, of the states that reduced taxes, a handful of states distributed rebate checks to some or all of the state's taxpayers. These states were Connecticut, Minnesota, Oregon, and Wisconsin. A brief description of each of these states' rebate programs follows.
In Oregon, the source of the tax rebates dates back to the passage of the "two percent kicker" law in 1979. This law stipulates that if actual revenues to the state's General fund in a biennium exceed the amount that was forecasted by at least two percent, then the overage is to be returned to taxpayers. Starting in 1995, the Oregon legislature changed the law to provide for direct payment of taxpayers' refunds through rebate checks. These checks are paid out as a proportion of the income tax paid the second year of the previous biennium. For example, in 1997-98, actual revenues exceeded predicted revenues by $167.3 billion, and so in 1999, rebate checks were mailed out in the amount of 4.57 percent of a taxpayer's liability in 1998. In the years under analysis, the rebate checks ranged from 4.57 percent to 14.37 percent of a taxpayer's previous year's liability. For more detail on the history of Oregon's tax rebates, see Oregon Department of Revenue (2001) .
In Minnesota, a bill containing $2.9 billion in tax cuts, including a tax rebate totaling between $1.25 billion and $1.3 billion, was signed into law on May 18, 1999.
5 Though formally a sales tax rebate, the rebates were based on the amount of income reported on Minnesota income tax forms two years prior, and ranged from $212 to $2,593 for single individuals or married individuals fi ling separately and from $371 to $5,186 for married taxpayers fi ling jointly. 6 The checks were mailed out in August. 7 In 2000, another round of rebate checks was sent out in August, but the size of the checks was much smaller than in the previous year, and eligibility for the checks had expanded. 8 In this year, the rebates ranged from $95 to $1,200 for those who were single or married fi ling separately, and $168 to $2,400 for those married fi ling jointly. In 2001, a fi nal round of rebate checks was mailed in August. 9 3 Of course, most states have balanced budget requirements, so that these surpluses only existed until they were returned back to taxpayers in the form of tax or fee cuts, put away in rainy day funds or spent. 4 For more information on how various states used their surplus funds, see National Association of State Budget Offi cers (various years). 5 For a more detailed chronology of the development of the Minnesota tax rebate, see Lopez Baden (1999a) , Whereatt (1999), and Lopez Baden (1999b) . 6 Dependents and those who did not report any taxable income were not eligible for the rebate. 7 A sales tax rebate was also available for out of state residents who had paid sales tax on purchases in Minnesota in 1997, but to claim it, nonresidents had to show receipts documenting the purchases. Such a rebate was also available in 2000 and 2001. In the estimations that follow, I ignore this aspect of the program, as I cannot identify in my data which individuals made purchases in Minnesota. This aspect of the policy may be problematic, however, in that I am using, in part, Wisconsinites as a control group for Minnesotans who received the rebate check, and would tend to bias downward any estimates. However, these rebates were not widely known outside of Minnesota, and so the chance that the individuals in my data actually claimed such a rebate is minimal. 8 The rebates were again based on reported income two years prior, but for the 2000 rebate, individuals who were working dependents, social security recipients who did not report taxable income, and taxpayers who fi led a 1998 tax return to receive a refundable tax credit were now eligible to receive rebate checks. 9 The format of the rebate was similar to the 2000 rebate, with the exception that eligibility was again expanded to include individuals who received income from a government pension, even if they did not fi le a tax return in 1999.
In this year, rebates ranged from $108 to $1,464 for those who were single or married fi ling separately, and from $213 to $2,967 for those married fi ling jointly.
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In Wisconsin, a bill that included tax rebates totaling $700 million was signed into law on November 17, 1999. The checks were mailed out in January, 2000. This rebate was also formally a sales tax rebate, but was based on a taxpayer's adjusted gross income in a previous year.
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The rebate checks ranged in size from $360 to $534 for married couples fi ling jointly, and from $184 to $267 for those fi ling as single, head of household, or married fi ling separately. 12 Finally, in Connecticut, a law containing a tax rebate provision was signed into law in May of 1998. Individuals were eligible for the rebate if they had either fi led a 1997 Connecticut income tax return or paid Connecticut property tax on a primary residence or motor vehicle in 1997. Considerably smaller than the other states' rebates, the maximum rebate amounts were $150 for married taxpayers fi ling jointly, $120 for heads of households, and $75 for single taxpayers and married taxpayers fi ling separately. Individuals received the lesser of these maximum amounts and their 1997 tax liability (after the property tax credit was taken), subject to a lower bound of $50. Most of these rebate checks were mailed out in July of that year, with the balance being mailed soon after. In 1999, another round of rebate checks was sent out, this time in September. These rebates amounted to $50 for single taxpayers, and $100 for joint taxpayers.
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One must note, however, that like the federal rebates that were enacted as part of EGTRRA 2001, these state rebates were often parts of larger tax bills that contained other provisions that might affect consumers' expectations of their after-tax income. For example, the 1999 Minnesota rebate legislation also contained income tax rate cuts, as did the 2000 rebate legislation. Around the time of the passing of the 2001 Minnesota rebate legislation, a property tax cut was passed. Finally, in Connecticut, the 1999 tax rebate law included several income tax changes including an increased standard deduction for single fi lers and several increased tax credits. All of these tax cuts were permanent tax cuts and, thus, would have an effect on households' expectations of their permanent income; therefore, these changes would serve to increase households' expectations of their income beyond that which was caused by the tax rebates.
On the other hand, in Wisconsin, the 1999 tax rebate legislation also included a one-year suspension of the property and rent tax credit. This would serve to dampen the expectation of an increase in households' income from the rebate, though by a small magnitude, since this tax change was temporary.
As a robustness check to the results that follow, I omit households in Connecticut and Minnesota whose rebates were announced at the same time as other tax provisions that would serve to increase 10 Figures on the 2000 and 2001 rebates come from the Minnesota Department of Revenue (various years). 11 In order to be eligible for the rebate, an individual or couple had to have owed a positive amount of Wisconsin tax in 1998. In addition, non-residents who could document that they paid more than $20 in Wisconsin sales tax were eligible to receive a rebate of 30.4 percent of that amount, up to a maximum of $267. However, I cannot identify the location of purchases in the previous year for any individuals in my sample, so I cannot use this provision to help identify the effects of this provision of the Wisconsin rebate on consumer spending. This aspect of the policy may be problematic, however, in that I am using, in part, Minnesotans as a control group for Wisconsinites who received the rebate check. However, these rebates were not widely known outside of Wisconsin, and so the chance that the individuals in my data actually claimed such a rebate is minimal. 12 For more information on the Wisconsin sales tax rebate, see Roe (1999) . 13 For more information on the Connecticut tax rebates, see Connecticut Department of Revenue Services (1998, 1999) .
their expectation of permanent income. It turns out that the effect of the rebate declines somewhat with this change, but the estimated overall consumption response is not signifi cantly different from the base specifi cation. Summary provisions of these tax rebate programs are presented in Table 1 .
DATA AND ESTIMATION STRATEGY

Consumer Expenditure Survey Data
The data for this study come from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) from the years 1995-2001. The CEX consists of rotating short panels. Every three months, respondents are asked about their expenditures in a variety of categories in the three months prior to the interview. A household is kept in the sample for fi ve interviews. The household is given a baseline set of questions in the fi rst interview, and then is attempted to be contacted for four additional interviews. They are then dropped from the sample. Hence, if a household is successfully contacted for all quarters of their wave, one can obtain data on 12 consecutive months of expenditures.
Respondents are not necessarily asked about consumption in the previous calendar quarter. For example, a household interviewed in the second quarter in May would be asked about their consumption in the months of February, March, and April, whereas an individual interviewed in the second quarter in June would be asked about consumption in March, April and May. I will refer to these quarters of response as respondent quarters. I use consumption in a respondent quarter as the unit of observation, and estimate the effect of rebate receipt (and announcement) on changes between two adjacent respondent quarters.
14 To account for this design of the dependent variable, I include in all specifi cations a full set of interview month dummies to control for differences in changes in expenditure that might result from individuals being interviewed in different months within a particular calendar quarter.
In this study, I examine the effect of tax rebates on total expenditures, and expenditures disaggregated into durable and nondurable purchases. Total expenditures are defined as reported total expenditures in the CEX less expenditures on education, medical expenses, car and truck purchases, cash contributions to other individuals and charities, and contributions to pensions and retirement Notes: In Oregon, the Enactment Month is the month in which the "Kicker" amount is announced. In all other states, the Enactment Month is the month in which the authorizing legislation was signed.
accounts. 15 Expenditures on durable goods are defi ned as expenditures on furniture, fl oor coverings, major appliances, household equipment, small vehicles, and televisions and other electronics, and nondurable expenditures are defi ned as total expenditures less durable expenditures. In addition, I examine the response of food, gifts to charity, apparel and entertainment purchases separately.
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As has been noted elsewhere, consumption growth rates are very volatile in this type of data, and so there exist a substantial number of outliers. To minimize the impact of these outliers on the estimates presented, following Zeldes (1989) and Gruber (1997) , I omit from each regression all individuals for whom the change in total expenditures increased by more than a factor of three or decreased by more than two-thirds.
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In addition, I cut from the sample all individuals for whom the income response was incomplete. Sample sizes after the various sample cuts are presented in Table 2 .
To control for other demographic variables that may affect the amount of expenditures for a given household, I also use data on the age of the respondent, as well as the number of children and adults in the household.
In order to exploit the variation that comes from a policy that affected only residents of Connecticut, Minnesota, Oregon, and Wisconsin, I must identify which respondents reside in these four states. However, in the Consumer Expenditure Survey, in order to maintain the confi dentiality of some respondents, the variable denoting state of residence is set to that of some other state. Fortunately, when this recoding of the state variable is done, the observation is fl agged as having had the state variable recoded. Thus, in order to ensure that the sample contains no false residents of these states, I drop any individuals for whom the state variable has been recoded in this way.
Rebate Amounts
It would be desirable if the CEX collected information on the amount of state tax rebates that were received by respondents in each household. Unfortunately, such information was not requested of respondents, and so such data does not exist. As a result, it is necessary to use the data that is available in the CEX to impute rebate amounts for the households in the sample that lived in one of the rebatereceiving states during a quarter in which rebates were distributed or announced.
In most of the states, rebate amounts were functions of either adjusted gross 15 Most of these items are excluded in order to focus on the reaction of spending that is within a household's control, and are most likely made for the purpose of consumption. Car and truck purchases are excluded because they introduce large spikes in households' expenditure streams that are in all likelihood unrelated to rebate-check receipt. 16 I have also used data on food expenditures at home and food expenditures away from home in the following estimations. However, the results did not differ dramatically from the results for the more aggregated categories and are, thus, left out for the sake of brevity.
income or taxable income in previous years. Thus, imputing rebate amounts requires a measure of income earned for those individuals who lived in that state one or two years prior to the rebate year. Unfortunately, the Consumer Expenditure Survey does not contain data on income or location that far back, so some assumptions must be made in order to make this imputation. I fi rst assume that all individuals who report living in one of the four states in the interview year have not moved in the past two years, and are, thus, eligible to receive a rebate check. Second, since the CEX contains data on income in the previous 12 months as of the second and fi fth interviews, I create a measure of income in the year relevant to the rebate calculation by taking the earliest report of income and discounting it using the CPI-U price index. 18 The Minnesota and Oregon rebates were based on the amount of taxable income in a previous year. To translate the income variables reported in the CEX to taxable income, I assume that all married couples fi le jointly, all single individuals fi le single, and all individuals claim the standard deduction and exemptions available in that particular state and year. In Wisconsin, the rebate amounts were based on adjusted gross income, so I assume that respondents in the CEX reported their AGI as their income before taxes. Finally, using the state rebate formulae, rebate amounts were calculated for each household from these states.
In Connecticut, on the other hand, rebates in 1998 were distributed to anyone who had fi led an income tax return or had paid property taxes on a residence or motor vehicle, and the amount of the rebate was fi xed subject only to the requirement that the rebate check could not exceed the individuals' tax liability after taking the property tax credit in the previous year. To impute these rebate amounts, I use data from the respondent's base interview on home and car ownership, and assume that only households that reported ownership of either of these received a rebate check. In addition, due to the lack of information on tax liability in the previous year, I assume the maximum amount was received.
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Since some consumer units may contain more than one tax unit, I use the CEX member-characteristics fi les to calculate rebate amounts separately for the head (and wife if applicable) of the consumer unit, and for all other individuals residing in the consumer unit.
20 I then sum these amounts within the consumer unit to arrive at a total amount of imputed rebates received.
The benefit of using these imputed rebate amounts in the regressions is that they account for the different rebate amounts that households received, both across and within states. However, although these imputations should work well for those individuals with steady income and whose geographic location is steady, they will probably perform poorly for those observations with highly variable income or those who have moved.
Although the CEX cannot be used to gauge the appropriateness of these assumptions, other datasets can shed some light on this issue. In Table 3 , using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), I examine the extent to which residents of the states and years under analysis exhibited steady state of residence and income amounts. 21 18 The total before-tax income variable from the CEX is used for this calculation. 19 Lending credence to this assumption is that fact that, in 1999, this constraint on rebate amounts was dropped, and everyone received an amount fi xed by marital status. 20 In these calculations, I assume that the head (and wife if applicable) received all income that is only reported at the consumer unit level. 21 Unfortunately, due to the bi-yearly collection of the PSID starting in 1997, it is not possible to look at the exact years that are relevant for the rebates in this paper. Adjacent years, however, can be examined. As can be seen in the left panel of this table, among those who were in one of the rebate-receiving states in a rebatereceiving year, over 90 percent of respondents were in that state in the prior year on which the rebate is based. In the right panel, the correlation between discounted current income and income in the year on which the rebate was based is also generally high, exceeding 80 percent in all but three of the rebate state-year pairs.
Thus, it appears that the assumptions made in the calculation of the rebate amounts are not bad approximations to reality. Nevertheless, if they are wrong, then the rebate amounts may suffer from nonclassical measurement error, with an unknown bias resulting. To provide a check on the robustness of the results using imputed rebate amounts, I also perform the regressions using dummy variables for rebate receipt as regressors. This variable likely suffers from less measurement error, as the imputation of this variable depends primarily on the location of the respondent. 22 However, using dummy variables to characterize rebate receipt has a downside in that rebate checks differed greatly in amount both across states and within states. 23 As a result, treating such disparate policies identically in the estimation equations could result in magnifi ed standard errors on the rebate dummy variable coeffi cients.
Finally, to examine further who responds to the receipt of rebate checks, I run specifi cations that include only those who might be credit constrained. To do this, I include individuals with low asset/ income ratios by dividing a respondent's earliest observation of the total value of the balance in their savings and checking accounts, U.S. savings bonds, and the value of all stocks, bonds, mutual funds, and other securities by their earliest report of income, and cut the sample according to the magnitude of this variable. I also run regression separately by the marital status of the head of the consumer unit.
Summary statistics are presented in Table 4 . The base sample of individuals from the four rebate-receiving states Table 5 , the characteristics of these rebates are presented by state and year of receipt. Overall, the sample contains 518 households that received a rebate check in some quarter.
Estimation Method
If the rebate policies implemented in these four states induced their residents to increase their expenditures in the quarter in which the rebate check was received, then their expenditures should increase more (or decrease less) relative to the previous quarter than those of similar individuals in states that did not receive the rebate check.
One way to identify the effects of the rebate program, then, would be to compare the individuals in the four rebate-receiving states with individuals in other states. In essence, one could do a difference in differences estimation, letting individuals in the four states be the treatment group and individuals in other states be the control group. In order for this to be valid, however, one would have to make the assumption that, absent the tax rebate, the change in consumption in the rebate-receiving states would have been the same as that in the non-receiving states. This assumption would be problematic if the reason that these states issued rebate checks was that they had received some positive income shock, which would presumably also affect consumption directly. Since this story seems plausible, individuals in other states might not be a good control group for those in rebate-receiving states.
Instead of this identifi cation strategy, I exploit variation in the timing of rebates across rebate-receiving states to identify the effects of these rebates on expenditures. Essentially, for a rebate in a given state-quarter, individuals in the other states that at some point received a rebate, but did not receive one in that particular quarter, act as a control group for those who did receive the rebate in that quarter. For example, a rebate was distributed in Oregon during November of 1995. In the estimation, then, respondents from quarters containing November of 1995 living in Connecticut, Minnesota, or Wisconsin (who did not receive a rebate in that quarter) serve as a control group for those in Oregon (who did receive a rebate).
In order for this identifi cation strategy to be valid, I have to assume that the change in consumption in a rebate-receiving state-quarter, absent the rebate, would have been the same as in the other rebate receiving states. This assumption seems much more plausible than assuming that consumption would be the same as in the non-rebate states, but might still be a problem if rebates were passed quickly in response to positive shocks in income. In this case, the timing of the rebate would be correlated with the timing of the positive income shock, and so it may be the income shock to which the individuals are responding instead of the rebate. However, legislative delays diminish this concern, since the initial discussions of tax rebates usually occurred several months before any law was passed or any check was sent out. Nevertheless, as a robustness check, I also perform regressions using individuals in all other states as controls for the individuals in rebate-receiving states. In the base specification, similar to Souleles (1999 Souleles ( , 2002 25 In this specifi cation, α r can be thought of as a difference in differences estimate of the differential change in consumption in a rebate-receiving state in a quarter in which a tax rebate was received, with individuals in other states in that quarter serving as a control group.
Since I am using an analogue of a difference in differences methodology, especially in the dummy variables specifi cation, a sizable amount of identifying variation used in these specifi cations is across state variation. As noted by Bertrand, Dufl o, and Mullainathan (2004) , serial correlation in error terms is a concern in this type of study. As a result, asymptotic errors assuming independence of error terms across individuals and across time are likely to be biased downward, possibly suggesting significance in coeffi cients where none, in fact, exists. To account for these concerns, I report standard errors clustered at the state level.
RESPONSE TO RECEIPT OF REBATE
In Table 6 , I present estimates from specifications in which, as in [1], the dependent variable is the difference in the various expenditure categories, and the independent variable of interest is the amount of the rebate check. In Table  7 , results from specifications in which the independent variable is a dummy variable for rebate receipt are presented. It is useful to note that under the lifecycle hypothesis, if the receipt of rebate checks was anticipated, one would expect the α r coeffi cients to be zero in all specifi cations (see Browning and Lusardi (1996) ). If the estimated coefficients are significantly different from zero, one can interpret the results here as evidence against a simple lifecycle model.
The top panels present results from the base specifi cation. In the top panel of Table 6 , the coeffi cient on the rebate amount is 0.252, suggesting that individuals spent about one quarter of the rebate in the quarter of receipt. It is, however, insignifi cant. From the other columns, coefficients on rebate amounts in the nondurables, charity, apparel and entertainment expenditure regressions have positive coeffi cients, suggesting that an increase may have occurred among these categories of expenditures. However, only the coeffi cient in the apparel expenditure regression is signifi cantly different from zero.
In the top panel of Table 7 , results from the specifi cation with dummy variables for rebate receipt are presented. In this specifi cation, results are more mixed. The coeffi cient on the rebate dummy in the total expenditure regression is positive, but small and insignifi cant, suggesting that individuals spent only about $5 of the rebate in the quarter of receipt. Most of the coeffi cients in the other columns are also insignifi cant. The one exception is the coeffi cient in the food regression, and it has the wrong sign, suggesting that individuals decreased spending by approximately $49 in the quarter of rebate receipt.
However, as noted above, these coeffi cients may be biased due to measurement error in my rebate amount and receipt variables. Recall that, since the CEX does not contain information on state of residence or income in years prior to the observation year, such variables were imputed on the basis of current information. This could lead to measurement error in identifying recipients of the rebates, or in the amount that they received, which would tend to attenuate the estimates.
To try to account for this, in the second panel of these tables, the equations are reestimated, with the sample restricted to a subset that is less likely to have moved over the past two years. According to U.S. Census Bureau (various years), single and divorced households, households under 30, and people who are not homeowners are more likely to have moved between states in any given year, so I eliminate these households from my sample. The resulting sample of married homeowners over the age of 30 also seems likely to have less variability in their income, so this sample should suffer from less measurement error in the independent variables.
The results from the rebate amount specifi cation now suggest that households spent slightly over one-fi fth of the rebate, with a coeffi cient of 0.208 that is significant at the ten percent level. Nondurable spending in general, and spending on apparel and charity in particular, are also estimated to have signifi cantly increased, with coeffi cients of 0.448, 0.179, and 0.036, respectively. The coeffi cient in the durable goods regression increased in magnitude to -0.240, but is still estimated to be insignifi cant.
In the corresponding rebate dummy specifi cations in Of course, a possible reason for the significant responses of households to when rebates are received is that, in some of the policies describe above, the enabling legislation or other legislation passed at around the same time contained provisions that also would affect households' incomes. In order to gauge the extent to which these other provisions have biased the effects from announcing a rebate, the regressions above were rerun with Minnesota households from 1999-2001 and Connecticut households from 1999 excluded from the sample. The results from these regressions are in the third panel of Tables 6 and 7. In the rebate amount specifi cation, the coeffi cient in the total expenditure regression drops somewhat to -0.003, and is insignifi cant. However, given the large standard error on this coeffi cient, this coeffi cient is not signifi cantly different from the results in the total above two panels, so it is unclear what to make of this result. The signs of durable and nondurable expenditures have switched compared to the top two panels, with durables exhibiting a signifi cant coeffi cient of 0.267, and nondurables responding negatively, though with an insignifi cant coeffi cient. However, charity and apparel expenditures still have positive and signifi cant coeffi cients, with magnitudes of 0.296 and 0.074, respectively, but the coeffi cients on food and entertainment are negative and signifi cant. When a dummy variable for rebate receipt is used, the results from the total expenditures specifi cation are more consistent with previous specifi cations, suggesting that individuals spent about $109, or slightly less than 30 percent of their rebate, in the quarter of receipt, though as above, coeffi cients in all of these regressions are insignifi cant.
As a fi nal robustness check, the specifi cations in the top panels of Tables 6 and  7 were rerun, but individuals outside of the above four states were included in the sample. In these specifi cations, all individuals in non-rebate-receiving states, including residents of states that never distributed a rebate, serve as controls for individuals in the rebate-receiving states. The results from this specifi cation are presented in the bottom panels of Tables 6 and  7 . Comparing this panel in Table 6 to the top panel, the coeffi cients are quite similar, though all are now insignifi cant. Coefficients are of a very similar magnitude to those estimated when only observations from the four states are included in the specifi cation. For the dummy variables specifi cation in Table 7 , the coeffi cients are generally smaller than before, but the negative coeffi cient in the charity regression is now signifi cant, and the coeffi cient on total expenditure is negative, though insignificant. However, across both of these tables, equality of the coeffi cients in the two specifications cannot be rejected.
Overall, then, the estimated results suggest that the rebate checks may have increased spending in the quarter of receipt (though the coefficients are sometimes the wrong sign and often insignifi cant), and may have affected the composition of expenditures. For total expenditures, the magnitudes estimated are quite similar to those found elsewhere in the literature, with the estimate from the base specifi cation implying that individuals spent about one-fourth of their rebate in the quarter of receipt, which is consistent with, thought slightly less than, the results found in Shapiro and Slemrod (2003) and Johnson et al. (2004) .
To probe whether the effect of rebates may have been different among the different states that distributed them, in Table  8 rebate amounts and dummy variables for rebate receipt are entered separately by state. 27 In this table, most coeffi cients are of plausible magnitude, and many are signifi cant. In the top panel, individuals in Oregon are estimated to have spent 1.4 percent of their rebate, Minnesotans are estimated to have spent 35 percent, and Wisconsinites are estimated to have spent 83 percent. However, only the coeffi cient on the Minnesota amount is signifi cant. The coeffi cient on rebates in Connecticut, on the other hand, is negative and signifi cant, with an implausible magnitude. In the dummy variable specifications, rebates in the same three states are estimated to have increased expenditures, though all coeffi cients are insignifi cant. Again, the coeffi cient for Connecticut is negative and signifi cant.
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Considering the components of expenditure, in the top panel, in Oregon it appears that durables increased during the quarter of receipt, although this increase is insignifi cant. In Minnesota, nondurables signifi cantly increased with the amount of the rebate and durables signifi cantly decreased, but these results are not robust to changing the independent variable to a dummy for rebate receipt. In Wisconsin, the coeffi cients on durables and nondurables are positive in both specifi cations, and the coeffi cient on durables is signifi cant at the 10 percent level.
Some of the results above suggest that individuals increased expenditures in response to the receipt of a rebate check, even though they had knowledge of this receipt at least two months prior to the checks being mailed, which is inconsistent with a simple permanent income/lifecycle hypothesis model. Others suggested an insignificant response to receipt of a rebate. However, either of these results could possibly be rationalized by appealing to credit constraints. For example, it may be that most individuals were able to smooth their consumption over quarters in which the rebate check was received, so for them the coeffi cient on rebate receipt is zero. However, some credit-constrained individuals desired to consume more than they could have absent receipt of the rebate check, so the receipt of the rebate check allowed them to spend an amount that would be closer to their unconstrained optimal amount. To probe this hypothesis, I follow Zeldes (1989) and Souleles (1999) , and cut the sample to include only those who had low asset to income ratios. I ran this estimation both including those with asset to income ratios less than 0.15, and with only those with ratios less than 0.25. Since the results from the two specifi cations are very similar, I present only the results from the estimation including those with asset to income ratios less than 0.25 in the top panel of Table 9 .
These results, however, provide little evidence either for or against a credit constraints story. The estimates in both the rebate amount and rebate dummy specifi -27 A specifi cation in which the effect of each rebate program within each state was treated separately was also estimated, but the resulting standard errors were too large for any of the coeffi cients to be meaningful. 28 The signifi cant negative coeffi cients for Connecticut were largely driven by a small number of observations with large rebate amounts and declines in total expenditures in excess of $5,000. When these observations were deleted, the coeffi cient dropped to -2.523 (1.526) in the amount specifi cation and -230.28 (155.58) in the dummy specifi cation. To check whether these observations had an inordinate infl uence on the base specifi cation, that specifi cation was rerun with all 1998 and 1999 observations from Connecticut cut from the sample. The results were quite similar to the base specifi cation. Note: All regressions are ordinary least squares (OLS). Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Demographic variables include the change in the number of children between the two quarters, the change in the number of adults in the two quarters, and age and its square. *** Signifi cant at the 1% level ** Signifi cant at the 5% level * Signifi cant at the 10% level Note: All regressions are ordinary least squares (OLS). Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Demographic variables include the change in the number of children between the two quarters, the change in the number of adults in the two quarters, and age and its square. *** Signifi cant at the 1% level ** Signifi cant at the 5% level * Signifi cant at the 10% level cations are insignifi cant, but the standard errors are substantial. As a result, one cannot rule out that credit-constrained individuals responded with larger or smaller amounts of spending than the sample as a whole.
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However, in Table 9 , I also cut the sample according to marital status and a stark result emerges. In the middle two panels, where only married respondents are included, the results are similar to the base specifi cation, with an insignifi cant response of total expenditure and a signifi cant response estimated only in the apparel regression. However, when single respondents are used in the bottom two panels, the marginal propensity to consumer out of the rebate is estimated to be in excess of one at 1.405, and split almost evenly between durables and nondurables, with coeffi cients of 0.769 and 0.635. Entertainment spending in particular is estimated to increase by 32 percent of the amount of the rebate in the quarter of receipt. These results suggest that, to the extent that being single is correlated with credit constraints, such constraints may be a cause of the response. On the other hand, it could also be that single individuals simply have shorter planning horizons than do married people, or have a higher marginal propensity to consume out of current income for some other reason.
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RESPONSE TO ANNOUNCEMENT OF REBATE
The results above are suggestive that, consistent with results found elsewhere in the literature, individuals may have increased spending in response to the receipt of a rebate check, with the results from the base specifi cation implying an increase of about a fourth of the size of the rebate.
Given this result, one might wonder whether individuals responded to the announcement of the rebate as well. In the recent studies of tax rebates, such an effect could not be estimated, as there was no variation in the timing of announcement across individuals within the United States. However, as can be seen above in Table 1 , the time of the signing of the enabling legislation for the tax rebates or the announcement of the amounts that the rebate checks would take varied widely across states, typically occurring two to three months prior to the receipt of the check.
When one adds in the information that households might have received during debates over this legislation, it is clear that households' information sets regarding their fl ow of future income changed before the actual receipt of the check. Thus, households may have reacted not only to the receipt of their rebate check, but also to the receipt of new information about their income stream. As such, households may have changed their expenditure path when they learned that they would receive a rebate of a certain size.
Unfortunately, it is diffi cult to pin down exactly when households' beliefs changed. For example, it could have been back when discussions about rebates initially started or when a certain political party 29 Following Parker (1999) and Hsieh (2003) , two other proxies for credit constraints were also tried: the head of household being under 40, and the household having income below the mean income. In these specifi cations, as well, no signifi cant positive effects of the receipt of rebate checks on the total amount of expenditures were found, and the standard errors were again too large to preclude credit constrained individuals having larger marginal propensities to consume than other rebate recipients. 30 A caveat to this fi nding is that this coeffi cient was strongly affected by a small number of observations with large rebate amounts. When observations with rebates in excess of $1,000 were deleted, the coeffi cient dropped to 0.267 (0.826). When only observations with rebates in excess of $2,000 were deleted, the coeffi cient dropped further to 0.043 (0.814). As would be expected, the dummy specifi cation is much more robust to the inclusion of these outliers.
increased their representation in the legislature. Thus, many changes in information are either unidentifi able or unobservable. However, one might expect the largest change in beliefs about how much of a rebate a household would receive would occur when enabling legislation is signed and/or rebate amounts are announced. Since these dates are observable, one can estimate whether households changed their expenditure path in response to such an announcement.
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To examine this empirically, I rerun the regressions above, but add to the specifi cation a variable that represents the announced amount of the rebate that the household will receive in a subsequent month. The estimation equation, then, is of the form where announced rebate ist denotes the rebate amount anticipated to be received. For some individuals, the respondent-quarter of announcement is the same as the respondent-quarter of receipt. For example, individuals interviewed in Connecticut in August, 1998, reported their expenditure over May, June and July of that year, which covers both the month of announcement and the quarter of receipt. However, for most individuals in the sample, the respondent-quarter of announcement and respondent-quarter of receipt will be two distinct quarters, and it is from these individuals' observations that separate announcement and receipt effects can be identifi ed.
These results are presented in Table 10.  Comparing this table to Tables 6 and 7 , the received rebate results are essentially the same. Turning to the announced rebate coeffi cients, the coeffi cient in the rebate amount specifi cation is very close to zero and is insignifi cant, suggesting that total expenditures did not increase in response to the announcement of the rebate. Looking at the subcomponents of expenditures yields an interesting pattern. The coeffi cient on the announced rebate amount in the durables equation is positive and signifi cant, while the coeffi cient in the nondurables equation is negative. This suggests that households may have shifted some expenditures to purchase durable goods in anticipation of the rebate.
Looking at the dummy variable specification in the bottom panel, similar results are found. The coefficient on the announced rebate variable in the total expenditures specification is negative but small and insignificant. However, the coefficient on durable expenditures is positive, suggesting that individuals increased spending on durable goods by about $73 in the quarter that the rebate was announced, with a shift in expenditures away from nondurables.
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Overall then, there is little evidence that individuals increased total expenditures in response to the announcement of rebates, but some evidence that the composition of expenditures may have changed in response to announcements of the rebates. 31 Of course, such an announcement does not happen in a vacuum in a particular quarter, as leading up to the signing of a law and an announcement of the signing, there is typically legislative debate, interviews in the press, and so forth. Results in this section, then, can be interpreted as the effect of all these activities that occurred during the quarter of announcement, and not necessarily the signing of the law per se. 32 Possible intuition for this fi nding could come from the mental accounts literature. For example, people could view this expected income as money to be spent on a large item. However, purchasing the item in anticipation of receiving the rebate check requires a decrease in contemporaneous nondurable spending. Note: All regressions are ordinary least squares (OLS). Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Demographic variables include the change in the number of children between the two quarters, the change in the number of adults in the two quarters, and age and its square. *** Signifi cant at the 1% level ** Signifi cant at the 5% level * Signifi cant at the 10% level CONCLUSION This paper uses data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey from 1995 through 2001 to estimate the consumption response to a sequence of tax rebates implemented in four states during these years. The results generally suggest an increase in expenditures of approximately one-fi fth to one-fourth of the amount of the rebate in the quarter of receipt. The estimates also suggest positive effects on nondurable spending and spending on apparel in particular, and among households with single respondents. The results vary substantially, however, depending on the sample, regressor used, and component of expenditure examined, with several variables entering insignifi cantly or with the wrong sign. The announcement of a rebate is estimated to have had a small and insignifi cant effect on the amount of spending, but may have shifted the composition of spending toward durable goods in the quarter of announcement.
The identifi cation strategy used in this paper relied on individuals in rebatereceiving states who did not receive a rebate in a particular time period serving as controls for those in states who did receive rebates in that period. Although different from the sources of variation used to identify previous effects of tax rebates, reassuringly, the results from such an identifi cation strategy are consistent with those found in Shapiro and Slemrod (2003) and Johnson et al. (2004) .
In addition, the identifi cation strategy used here has a wide variety of applications beyond looking at the effects of tax rebates on consumer expenditures. Although changes in federal tax rates are infrequent and apply to most households similarly situated, changes in state tax parameters happen much more frequently, and the variation in such changes over time allows for some individuals to serve as controls for others who are subject to the changes at a particular time.
As a result, since the responsiveness to state tax changes appears to be similar to the responsiveness to federal tax changes, studying state income tax changes appears to be a fruitful area for further research. State-level variation could just as easily be used to examine the effects of other tax changes on expenditures, such as changes in tax rates, withholding tables, and tax credits, which are much more diffi cult to plausibly identify when they take place at the federal level.
Finally, although little responsiveness of expenditures was found for quarters in which checks were announced, the response of expenditures to the receipt of these state rebates (at least among some subsets of households) suggests that such policies may indeed have a role in increasing consumer spending, at least temporarily.
